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LABOR LAW - CERTIFIED UNION'S Loss OF MAJORITY STATUS
DURING CERTIFICATION YEAR AND WITHOUT FAULT OF EMPLOYER
AS JUSTIFICATION FOR REFUSAL TO BARGAIN -The "one year certification rule" was originated in the early years of the National
Labor Relations Board and has been consistently applied by it. 1
Essentially it provides that after certification an employer is required to bargain with the certified union for a reasonable time,
which is usually one yea:r2 in the absence of "unusual circumstances." The certified union is conclusively presumed to represent a majority of employees in the unit for that period, the presumption afterward becoming rebuttable.3 This system of successive conclusive and rebuttable presumptions represents a compromise between the competing policies of giving a union time to
establish a workable bargaining relation with the employer free
from outside pressures and allowing a majority of employees to
be represented by the bargaining agent of their own choice.
It is well established that if the employer causes the union to
lose its majority standing by the commission of unfair labor practices, such as intimidating or interrogating employees or assisting
the organizational efforts of an outside union, the loss of majority
status by the inside union is no defense to an unfair labor practice
charge of refusal to bargain.4 This same principle holds true where
the only sin of the employer is his refusal to bargain and the loss of

1 Whittier Mills Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 457 (1939); Appalachian Electric Power Co., 47
N.L.R.B. 821 (1943); Anderson Mfg. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1944); Mengel Co., 80
N.L.R.B. 705 (1948); Sexton Welding Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 344 (1952); Ray Brooks, 98
N.L.R.B. 976 (1952); Henry Heide, 107 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1954).
2 While stated in terms of a "reasonable period," one year is almost automatically
found "reasonable." But in Globe Automatic Sprinkler Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 253 (1951),
eleven months and one week was found to be a "reasonable time," the Board saying that
what is reasonable will depend upon the facts of the particular case.
3 Toolcraft Corp., 92 N.L.R.B. 655 (1950).
4 NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U.S. 318, 60 S.Ct. 918 (1940); Medo Photo
Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 64 S.Ct. 830 (1944); Dallas Concrete Co., 102
N.L.R.B. 1292 (1953).
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majority status occurs, subsequent to that refusal. 5 This is simply
because the loss of majority status subsequent to the commision
of the admitted unfair refusal to bargain is irrelevant to the question of whether an order against the unfair practice should be
issued or enforced, as the case may be.
The one year certification rule is used to find that a refusal
to barga1n is itself an unfair labor practice. In the two situations
just noted, however, the rule is not needed, for the existence of
the unfair practice can be established independently of it. The
only instance in which the rule is applied is when the employer
refuses to bargain with a certified union after a majority of employees in the bargaining unit have repudiated it of their own
free will and without the intervention of the employer. The
Board has consistently applied the rule to find such a refusal an
unfair labor practice,6 and this has generally,7 though not uniformly,8 been upheld by the courts. The Supreme Court has recently approved the rule in this context. 9 It is the writer's opinion
that this application of the rule is questionable.

I. Analysis of Arguments in Support of the Rule
Basically, four arguments are urged on behalf of the rule. (1)
When Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act in
1947 to allow employees to petition for decertification, it limited
such elections to one per year. This formal method for revocation
of a union's bargaining authority became the only way for employees to withdraw the union's power to represent them.10 It is argued
5 Franks Brothers Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 64 S.Ct. 817 (1944); NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512, 62 S.CL 397 (1942); International Assn. of Machinists v. NLRB, 311
U.S. 72, 61 S.CL 83 (1940); NLRB v. Mexia Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563, 73 S.Ct. 826 (1950).
The Board recognizes that there may be factors other than the refusal to bargain contributing to defection from the union, but it will not try to "disentangle" them. NLRB v.
Andrew Jergens Co., (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 130.
6 Botany Worsted Mills, 41 N.L.R.B. 218 (1942); Vulcan Forging Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 621
(1949); cases cited in note I supra.
7 NLRB v. Botany Worsted Mills, (3d Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 876; NLRB v. Brooks,
(9th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 899; NLRB v. Appalachian Power Co., (4th Cir. 1944) 140 F.
(2d) 217; NLRB v. Sanson Hosiery Mills, (5th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 350; NLRB v. Henry
Heide, (2d Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 46.
s NLRB v. Vulcan Forging Co., (6th Cir. 1951) 188 F. (2d) 927; Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB, (6th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 613; NLRB v. Inter-City Advertising
Co., (4th Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 244. See also NLRB v. Poultry Enterprises, Inc., (5th Cir.
1953) 207 F. (2d) 522; NLRB v. Prudential Ins. Co., (6th Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 385.
9 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 75 S.Ct. 176 (1954).
10 NLRB v. Sanson Hosiery Mills, (5th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 350; NLRB v. Mexia
Textile Mills, 339 U.S. 563, 70 S.CL 826 (1950); Bishop, McCormick and Bishop, 102
N.L.R.B. 1101 (1953); United States Gypsum Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 964 (1950); Brooks v.
NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 75 S.Ct 176 (1954).
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that if an informal repudiation, as by a petition signed by a majority of employees, could have the same effect as a decertification
election, the limitation on the use of the decertification procedure
would become meaningless. But this argument proves too much.
Employees can petition for a decertification election if a union is
"certified or is currently recognized by their employer." 11 It has
been held that if the members of a recognized but non-certified
union informally revoke the union's bargaining authority, an
employer does not violate section 8 (a) (5) by refusing to bargain
with it thereafter.12 Thus in a case where Congress expressly allowed the use of a decertification proceeding, it is not the only
method of withdrawing a union's authority. Also, the Board,
can, on request or on its own motion, revoke its prior certification
without conducting a decertification election.13 Further, the one
year certification rule itself provides that an employer can lawfully refuse to bargain with a certified union within the certification year if there are "unusual circumstances" present.14 It is,
therefore, apparent that Congress, the NLRB, or the courts do
not require the formal decertification proceeding to revoke a
union's authority in every case where it might be used. The logical
inference is that other valid ways of withdrawing representative
authority from a union, even a certified union, are available to
the employees.
(2) A Board-supervised secret ballot best indicates the free
choice of the employees, and, it is argued, a non-supervised, public,
and informal petition should not be allowed to nullify it.15 But in
11 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 144, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §159
(c)(l )(A)(ii) (italics supplied).
12 NLRB v. Mayer, (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 286; NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain
Co., (7th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 144.
13Telegraph Publishing Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1173 (1953); TELLER, LABoR DISPUTES AND
COLLECfIVE BARGAINING §398.109 (Supp. 1950).
14 "Unusual circumstances" have been found only infrequently, and none since 1947.
NLRB v. Henry Heide, (2d Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 46. Unusual circumstances were found
when the certified union had been dissolved within the certification year [Public Service
Electric and Gas Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 325 (1944)] and where by a "collective, formal effort"
on the part of employees there was affiliation with another union after a local schism.
Carson, Pirie Scott and Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 935 (1946); Jasper Wood Products, Inc., 72
N.L.R.B. 1306 (1947). Extreme reduction of personnel is not of itself an unusual circumstance. Bethlehem Steel Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 277 (1947). Nor is the filing of a certification or
decertification petition. NLRB v. Henry Heide, supra. In view of the infrequence of the
finding of unusual circumstances, the exception may now be academic. But see Member
Murdock's concurring opinion in Henry Heide, 107 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1954), in which it is
suggested that the exception should not be so narrowly confined as it has been in the past.
15 Lift Trucks, 75 N.L.R.B. 998 (1948); NLRB v. Botany Worsted Mills, (3d Cir. 1943)
133 F. (2d) 876; Anderson Mfg. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1944); Ray Brooks, 98 N.L.R.B.
976 (1952). Bishop, McCormick and Bishop, 102 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1953), although an extreme
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the cases where the one year certification rule is necessary to find
an unlawful refusal to bargain, it is assumed that the repudiation
is not the result of pressure on the employees, but that it is in fact
the free choice of a majority of the employees. If the employer
instigates the defection, such activity itself can be found to be an
unfair labor practice without resort to the one year rule,16 and
the remedial order to bargain can be enforced whether or not
the union represents a majority of employees when the order is
issued or enforced.17 The Board has been alert to detect subtle
pressures in other contexts, and its expertise should be adequate
to determine whether the informal repudiation represents the
free choice of the employees.
(3) It is said that doing away with the rule would encourage
employers to delay bargaining in the hope that the union would
lose its majority status, thereby relieving the employer of the obligation to bargain.18 However, the employer is required "to bargain in good faith," 19 and this elastic concept can be easily stretched
to cover a multitude of sins, including dilatory and insincere
tactics. If the union does in fact represent a majority of employees
in the bargaining unit when the employer engages in stalling tactics, such stalling then is an unfair labor practice. 20 In such a
case, the one year certification rule is not needed; the violation of
section 8 (a) (5) exists independently of it and an order to bargain
can be enforced even though the union has lost the support of a
majority of employees after the employer's commission of the unfair labor practice.21
It may be conceded that abandoning the rule will encourage
some employers to drag their feet in bargaining. But machinery
for remedying and discouraging this is available in the "good
faith bargaining" requirement. Admittedly this would require
litigation of each case to determine the bona £ides of the employer.
It is arguable, however, that this burden of increased litigation
case, exemplifies what is feared. Within one year's time a union was certified, repudiated,
the repudiation repudiated, and the repudiation of the repudiation repudiated.
16 Southern Block and Pipe Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 590 (1950); Gottlieb and Co., 102
N.L.R.B. 1708 (1953); Century Oxford Mfg. Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 835 (1943).
17 Cases cited in note 5 supra.
18 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 75 S.Ct. 176 (1954); Cuffman Lumber Co., 82 N.L.R.B.
296 (1949); NLRB v. Appalachian Power Co., (4th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 217; NLRB v.
Andrew Jergens Co., (9th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 130.
19 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 142, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158 (d).
20 Cuffman Lumber Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 296 (1949); Marshall and Bruce Co., 75 N.L.R.B.
90 (1947).
21 Cases cited in note 5 supra.
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will not outweigh the advantages of assuring employees complete
freedom to choose their bargaining representative. It is true that
the "good faith" bargaining test is already uncertain and difficult
of application in specific cases. However, in the past the Board
has not hesitated to apply that standard simply because it is indefinite and often inexact. Cases in which the employer's good
faith was examined are legion, and there is no reason to anticipate
that the Board's experience in this area is inadequate.
(4) It is urged that, as a practical matter, the rule is needed to
promote stability and peace in industrial relations, 22 and to minimize strife resulting from raiding by outside unions. 23 But it is
doubtful whether lasting and peaceful industrial relationships are
actually encouraged in a plant by preventing the employees from
choosing freely their bargaining representative or by forcing them
to accept as their bargaining agent a union which a majority of
the employees do not desire to have represent them. As for the
raiding argument, what would be the result of abandoning the
rule? The rule can apply only if the employer bargains with the
outside union after a majority of employees have chosen it, for
an employer violates section 8 (a) (5) if he refuses to bargain with
the certified union while it still has a majority, 24 and he violates
section 8 (a) (I) if he encourages the outside union in its organizational campaign or interferes with the certified union's attempt
to retain its membership. Section 8 (b) (4) (C) prohibits the outside union from resorting to the pressures of collective action to
gain bargaining rights while the inside union is certified. In such
a case, the word "raiding" is hardly the term to describe what has
actually happened. The employees have not been subjected to
any unlawful pressure. After weighing the pros and cons of shifting their affiliation, they have exercised the right expressly given
them in sections 7 and 9 (a) to choose their own bargaining representative. By hypothesis, the employer is neutralized, and the
employees have freely expressed their desires after having heard
and considered the merits of the change. Use of the one year
certification rule freezes their bargaining status for a year, and
in these circumstances would seem likely to incite just as much if
not more unrest, discontent and instability than it quiets.
22 NLRB v. Brooks, (9th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 899; Mengel Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 705
(1948); Henry Heide, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1954); NLRB v. Appalachian Power Co.,
(4th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 217.
23 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 75 S.Ct. 176 (1954).
24Franks Brothers Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 64 S.Ct. 817 (1944); NLRB v. P.
Lorillard Co., 314 U.S. 512, 62 S.Ct. 397 (1942).

116

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

II. Conclusions

Abandoning the rule might conceivably relieve an employer
of a duty to bargain with any union in some cases. This could
happen as follows: one month after a certification election a majority of employees by petition repudiate certified union A. Outside union B then claims to represent a majority of employees
_in the bargaining unit. The employer states that he doubts
whether either A or B actually represents a majority, and declines
to bargain with either until one or the other is certified. Some
cases have held that the employer can impose this condition precedent to bargaining when he has good faith doubts as to a union's
claim of majority status.25 As section 9 (c) (3) limits elections to
one per year, no election could be held for eleven months, and the
employer would then have no duty to bargain with either union
A orB.
The Board has never had to face this problem because the one
year certification rule requires the employer to bargain with certified union A for a year regardless of loss of support. Many cases,
however, have held that an employer cannot require certification
as a condition precedent to bargaining when a union offers other
reasonable proof of its majority standing. 26 In such instances, the
employer can have no "good faith doubt" of the union's status.
If the one year certification rule were to be abandoned, this line of
cases could be used to avoid the difficulty. The employer is required to bargain with the union representing a majority of the
employees. Proof of majority status could be had without having
an election by a Board comparison of authorization, membership,
or check-off cards with the. employer's payroll. If a union could
not submit such proof to the Board to substantiate its claims, it
would seem to be a reasonable inference that it does not represent a majority and therefore is not entitled to act as bargaining
representative.
25 D. H. Holmes Co. v. NLRB, (5th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 876; Zall v. NLRB, (9th
Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 499; Cuffman Lumber Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 296 (1949); NLRB v
Stewart, (5th Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 8.
26 NLRB v. W. T. Grant Co., (9th Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 7II (check of authorization
cards "or any other quick procedure"); Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1950)
185 F. (2d) 732 (membership cards); NLRB v. Kobritz, (5th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 8;
United States Gypsum Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 964 (1950) (membership ledger); NLRB v. Geigy
Co., (9th Cir. 1954) 2ll F. (2d) 553 (authorization cards); Hart Cotton Mills, Inc., 91
N.L.R.B. 728 (1950) (dues check-off cards); National Gas Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 273 (1952)
(participation in strike called by union). See generally the cases cited in I CCH LAB. L.
REP., ,r3042.73 et seq.
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Ultimately, the effect of the one year certification rule is to
prevent temporarily an employee from withdrawing a union's authority to bargain for him. Its justification can only be that it
furthers the collective bargaining process by giving a union once
certified as the proper bargaining agent a chance to establish a
working relation with the employer. Admittedly, in many cases,
it may substantially encourage the formation of sound collective
bargaining relationships. As indicated above, however, the rule
is not needed to prevent the employer from encouraging defection
from the certified union, or to require an employer to bargain in
good faith with the union in fact representing a majority of employees in the bargaining unit. If this is the case, suspension of
the power to change bargaining representatives during the certification year in order to promote collective bargaining runs squarely
against the "section 7 right" of employees "to bargain collectively
through agents of their own choosing." Section 9 (a) provides that
"representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees ... shall be the
exclusive representative of all the employees in such unit." The
one year certification rule modifies this to read that "representatives certified for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
Board . .. shall be the exclusive representative for one year of all
employees in such unit." 27 Likewise section 8 (a) (5) obligates an
employer "to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees." But the effect of the one year rule is to require the
employer "to bargain for one year with the certified union,
whether representing a majority of his employees or not."
The one year certification rule is not expressly mentioned in
the statute and is the result of Board practice. When a rule of
such origin detracts from statutory rights and modifies duties
expressly imposed by statute, it is difficult to justify. A labor organization exists for the benefit of the employees whom it represents, and its rights are designed to allow it to make that representation effective. These rights should accrue from the fact that it
represents a majority of employees and not from the fact that it
is certified as representing a majority of them when in fact this
is no longer true. Yet the one year rule emphasizes the fact of
certification and not the fact of actual representation of a majority
of employees, to the derogation of the express statutory right of
those employees to choose their bargaining representatives.
Eugene Alkema, S.Ed.
27 Italics supplied.

